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LINTR　OD　UCTION：
　　　　Japan’s　Official　Development　Assistance（ODA）celebrates　its　fiftieth　anni－
versary　in　2004．　Aiming　to“occupy　an　honored　place　in　an　international
society，”1　Japan　launched　its　technical　cooperation　program　by　joining　the　Co－
lombo　Plan　in　1954（JICA　1999：8）．　It　was　only　two－and－a－half　years　after　the
country　had　recovered　sovereignty　after　six－and－a－half　years　of　humiliating　U．S．
postwar　occupation．　The　most　important　task　fbr　the　country，　therefbre，　was
still　the　reconstruction　and　development　of　its　own　war－torn　economy，　rather
than　helping　other　countries．　However，　the　economy　quickly　recovered，　and　this
was　f（）llowed　by　the　renowned“miraculous”2　high　growth　period　from　the　early
1960s　to　the　mid－1970s．　At　the　same　time　the　aid　program　started　to　mushroom，
resulting，　soon　afterwards，　in　Japan　becoming　one　of　the　world’s　biggest　donor
countries（see　Chart　l　below）．
　　　　Japan’s　ODA　recorded　over　ten　billion　dollars　f（）r　the　first　time　in　l991，
thus　surpassing　the　United　States　and　becoming　the　top　donor，　the　largest　ODA
provider　in　the　world．　Japan　maintained　the　position　fbr　ten　years　until　20003，
establishing　its　idelltity　as　the　world’s　leading　donor　and　aid　power．　In　2000，
Japan　provided　l　3．51　billion　dollars（1，456　billion　yen）to　more　than　150　coun－
tries．　This　figure　accounted　for　25．2％of　the　total　amount　of　ODA　provided　by
the　22　DAC4　countries．　Japan　was　the　largest　donor　in　54　countries　in　the　same
year（OI）Aレレり蛎’e　P（甲θr　2002）．
　　　　Notwithstanding　its　distinctive　perfbrmance　in　terms　of　the　amount　of　re－
sources　provided，　Japan’s　ODA　does　not　always　receive　positive　evaluation　either
in　the　international　aid　community　or　within　Japan．　Various　factors　can　be
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Preamble　to　the　Constitution　of　Japan．
It　was，　allegedly，　the　London－based　weekly　magazine，　The　Economist，　September　8，1962
（p．913），who　first　used　the　term“the　Japanese　miracle．”
The　United　States　became　the　largest　donor　again　in　2001．
Development　Assistance　Committee　of　the　Organisation　for　Economic　Cooperation　and
Development（OECD）．
一1一
＄million
18，000
16，000
14，000
12，000
10，000
8，000
6，000
4，000
2，000
Chart　1．
i4，489 15，323
13，239 13，608
1，429
lo，9521151 10，64011，259
896 9，439 89β
913 9，069 9，847
　　7，454
T，634
4，319
3ρ233，761　3，79
??71
一一一．．．一一 一
」一　⊥一 L
Trends　in　ODA　of　Major　DAC　Countries
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（net　disbursement　basis）
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Source：2002　DAC　Press　Release　cited　in　OのA　White　Paper　2003
Notes：1．　Does　not　include　aid　to　Eastern　Europe　and　ODA　Graduates．
　　　　　　2．Figures　for　the　US．A．　in　1991　and　l992　exclude　military　debt　relie£
identified　as　reasons　fbr　such　a　poor　reputation　in　spite　of　the　huge　resources
offered　from　the　nation’s　treasury，　especially　considering　Japan’s　current　eco－
nomic　difficulties5．　At　the　macro－statisticaレlevel，　first，　most　of　the　quality
（vs．　quantity）indices　clearly　show　a　rather　poor，　or　very　poor，　performance　f（）r
Japan．　In　2000，　Japan　ranked　in　12th　place　among　all　the　22　countries　in　the
DAC　in　its　ratio　of　ODA　to　GNI6（0．28％），22nd　in　grant　share，　and　21st　in
grant　element7．　Second，　at　the　macro　policy　leve1，　Japan　was－and　still　is，　to
some　extent－criticized　fbr　its　lack　of　clear　and　consistent　ODA　policy　or　phi－
10sophy．　A　related　condemnation　is　that　Japan’s　ODA　is　driven　solely　by　its　own
business／commercial　interests，　or　too　often　influenced　by　the　strategic　interest　of
the　United　States．　Moreover，　the　biased　geographical　distribution，　i．e．　the　con－
centration　on　Asia，　often　becomes　the　target　of　critical　comments，　while　the　lack
of　active　participation　in　donor　coordination　or　international　aid　policy　discus－
sions　is　another　point．　At　a　micro　prolect　level，　problems　are　too　many，　varied
and　specific　even　to　list　here－although　the　situation　may　not　necessarily　be　any
better　fbr　other　donor　countries．
　　　　Some　of　the　most　recent　developlnents　are　even　more　discouraging．　The
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Japan’s　fiscal　deficit　accounts　for　7．1％of　its　GDP　in　2004，　which　is　the　worst　in　major
industrial　economies（Ministry　of　Finance　http：／／www．mof．go．jp／jouhou／syukei／syO　14／
syOl4e．htm）
Gross　National　Income．
The　grant　share　is　the　proportion　of　the　amount　given　free（grant）in　the　total，　while　the
grant　element　is　an　index　developed　to　indicate　the　concessionality　of　the　aid（loan）condi－
tions．　The　grant　element（G．E．）of　a　commercial　loan　at　10％interest　rate　is　defined　as　O％，
while　that　of　grant　assistance　is　100％．　The　figure　varies　between　O％and　lOO％according
to　the　interest　rates，　loan　and　grace　periods．
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amount　of　Japan’s　ODA　has　been　decreasing　sharply　fbr　the　last　several　years，
while　other　major　donor　countries　reaffirmed　their　ODA　commitment　and　have
started　again　to　increase　it8．　If　this　trend　continues　fbr　another　few　years，　Japan’s
ODA　would　become　the　third　or　fburth　largest，　and　its　relative　size　to　the　na－
tional　economy　may　fall　to　be　the　least　among　the　DAC　countries（Watanabe＆
Miura　2003：34）．　In　this　connection，　it　is　important　to　note　that　the　government
of　Japan　renewed　its　ODA　Charter　in　August　2003　in　order　to　redefine　its　aid
program　to　accommodate　it　to　the　ever－changing　situation　in　the　international
communlty．
　　　　The　purpose　of　this　paper　is　to　explain　Japan’s　ODA，　encompassing　the
meaning　of　these　recent　developments．　Many　of　the　observations　in　the　litera－
ture，　both　domestic　and　overseas，　have　emphasized　Japan’s　commercial　or　neo－
mercantilist　nature　as　the　basic　tenet　of　its　aid　programs（e．g．　Rix　1980，1987，
1993；Nester　l　992）．　Others　claim，　in　addition，　the　importance　of　external　con－
siderations，　especially　US．　pressures，　as　factors　affecting　Japan’s　aid　policy．
Some　others　propose　more　a　comprehensive　approach，　taking　various　other　fac－
tors　一　including　history　and　institutions－into　account　in　order　better　to　explain
the　complex　process（e．g．　Orr　1990；Yasumoto　1986，1990；Shimomura，
Nakagawa＆Saito　1999）．　They　do　not　explain，　however，　the　recent　trend　of
decreasing　aid　donation　or　the　renewed　ODA　charter，　both　of　which　definitely
need　another　explanation．　The　approach　here　is　also　historical．　By　exploring　the
historical　development　of　Japan’s　ODA　with　a　fbcus　upon　the　transition　of　its
self－defining‘‘place　in　the　international　society”and　the　resultant‘‘apPropriate
role，”which　is　changing　with　the　country’s　ever－increasing　economic　power　and
prestige　in　the　world，　we　will　be　able　to　understand　the　whole　process　and　the
current　situation　fairly　well．
皿HISTORICAL　DEレELOPMENT　OF　JAPAN，S．4丑）
　　　Pl～OGR．4MS
1．War　Reparation　Payment　and　Trade　Promotion（mid・1950s－1960s）
　　　　As　noted　at　the　outset，　the　government　officially　acknowledges　the　partici－
pation　in　the　Colombo　Plan　in　October　1954　as　the　beginning　of　Japan’s　develop－
ment　cooperation．　The　actual　scale　of　the　event　and　its　impact，　however，　were
rather　small　and　symbolic．　Sixteen　trainees　were　accepted　fbr　technical　training
in　Japan　and　twenty－eight　Japanese　experts　were　sent　to　Southeast　Asian　coun－
tries　as　advisors　for　the　first　time　under　this　plan　in　1955，　while　there　were　other
larger　technical　training　programs　funded　by　the　United　States　and　international
organizations　such　as　the　United　Nations　starting　from　1954（JICA　l　999：9）．　It
8　Many　donor　countries　curtailed　ODA　or　maintained　its　stagnant　growth　in　the　previous
　　decade　due　to　their　tight　fiscal　status　and　increasing　domestic　skepticism　about　the　effective－
　　ness　of　aid．
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is，　therefore，　more　often　considered　that　Japan’s　ODA　in　practice．　had　its　origins
in　its　war　reparation　payment　and　related　economic　cooperation　towards　the
Asian．countries　it　occupied　during　World　War　II．
　　　　In　view　of　the　lesson　that　the　overly　heavy　cash　burdens　of　war　reparations
in　post－World　War　I　Germany　had　driven　the　nation　towards　the　totalitarian
regime　of　the　Nazis，　which　eventually　caused　the　devastating　Second　World
War，　the　Allied　Forces　initially　had　the　policy　of“just　reparations　in　kind，”g　not
in　cash，　fbr　Japan．　Aiming　at　facilitating　Japan’s　de－militalization　process　at　the
same　time，　theref（）re，　its　major　domestic　production　facilities　were　scheduled　to
be　relocated　to　the　Asian　countries　it　had　previously　occupied．　However，　the
emerging　Cold　War　tensions　changed　the　whole　direction　of　world　politics　in
飴vor　of　Japan：rapid　recovery　of　Japan’s　economy　came　to　be　understood　as
necessary　as　the　centerpiece　of　the　defense　system　against　the　increasing　commu－
nist　strength　in　the　Far　East．　Heavy　burdens　of　reparation　payments　as　well　as
the　removal　of　heavy　industrial　facilities　from　the　country　were　then　considered
as　detrimental　for　this　purpose．　Article　140f　the　San　Francisco　Peace　Treaty　in
1951prescribed　as　the　basic　framework　that　reparations　should　be　paid　in　serv－
ices，　not　in　kind　or　in　cash，　by　installments　over　a　long－term　period．
　　　　Details　were　negotiated　bilaterallyio　afterwards，　and　payments　started　ac－
cordingly　in　the　late　1950s　in　Japanese　services　and　goods　that　continued　over
five　to　twenty　years．　Goods　were　not　mentioned　originally　in　the　prescription　of
the　Treaty，　but　added　later　in　the　bilateral　negotiations　after　a　strong　request
from　the　recipients．　Provision　of　goods－capital　goods，　in　principle－was　desir－
able　also　for　Japan　with　her　already　resurgent　industries　if　it　would　not　incur　any
additional　fbreign　exchange　needs，　or　would　not　compete　with　other　commercial
exports　from　the　country．　It　would　create　demand　for　its　burgeoning　industries．
　　　　The　burdens　were　thus　substantially　mitigated　in　comparison　with　the　initial
plan　proposed　by　the　Allied　Forces．　Yet　the　payments　were　still　very　heavy　fbr
Japan，　which　had　to　rise　from　the　ashes．　Struggling　fbr　the　country’s　survival，
senior　bureaucrats　and　politicians　were　especially　keen　on　utilizing　this　as　an
opportunity　for　the　future．　A　director－general　of　the　Foreign　Ministry’s　Repara－
tion　Bureau　wrote　in　1959：
The　execution　of　reparation　payment　is　not　merely　the　fulfillment　of　an
obligation．　It　would　have　a　grave　influence　not　only　over　the　current　eco－
nomic　situation　but　also　over　our　current　and　future　political　and　economic
relations　with　the　recipient　countries．（Baisho－mondai　kenkyu－kai　1959）11
Yoshida　Shigeru，　an　ex－diplomat　prime　minister　from　1948　to　1954，　also　re－
corded　similar　comments　in　his　memoirs：
　9　Article　11，　the　Potsdam　Declaration，　July　26，1945．
10　Unlike　the　preceding　negotiations　in　the　peace　talks，　Japan　could　hold　an　equal　status　as　an
　　　　independent　nation　vis－a－vis　her　negotiation　counterparts．
　11　Translation　by　the　author．
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It　is　of　course　important　to　consider　the　reparation　issue　in　terms　of　its
burden　on　the　nation．　At　the　same　time，　however，　we　also　need　to　pay　due
attention　to　another　potential　outcome：that　the　payment　may　lead，　in　the
future，　to　greatly　extended　economic　relations　between　the　two　countries
concerned．（Yoshida　1957：168）12
　　　　At　the　same　time，　it　seemed　that　the　government　was　thinking　clearly　about
the　potential　role　the　reparation　payments　could　play　in　the　economic　and　indus－
trial　development　of　the　recipient　countries，　and　paid　some　eff（）rt　to　accommo－
date　them　to　the　local　situation　so　that　the　contributions　could　show　maximum
effectiveness（Baishomondai　kenkyu－kai　l　959：37－47）．
　　　　Reparations　were　paid　to　four　countries，　Burma，　the　Philippines，　Indonesia
and　South　Vietnam，　and　the　obligation　was　completed　in　1976　with　the　final
payment　to　the　Philippines．　Similar　compensatory　payments　were　extended　in
the　name　of　economic　cooperation　to　seven　other　Asian　and　Pacific　countries監3
which　were　officially　not　eligible　for　the　war　reparations14．　The　total　amount
Japan　paid　as　war　reparations　added　up　to　356，552　million　yen（1，012　million
＄US），and　if　all　the　economic　cooperation　as　quasi－reparations　was　included　it
amounted　to　601，829　million　yen（MITI　2000）．　It　should　be　noted，　in　addition，
that　these　payments　were　included　in　the　ODA　statistical　figures　of　the　period，
and　actually　constituted　a　major　part　of　the　grant　portion．　As　a　result，　the　grant
share　declined　significantly　in　the　1970s　while　the　total　amount　of　economic
cooperation－rnainly　led　by　the　private　sector－substantially　increased．
　　　　Heavy　indeed　were　the　burdens　fbr　the　war－torn　economy　of　Japan，　and
these　payments　functioned　as　the　policy　makers　expected．　They　contributed　to
the　recovery　and　development　of　emerging　industries　in　both　Japan　and　the
recipient　countries．　In　addition，　they　paved　the　way　for　further　Japanese　exports
and　investments　in　the　f（）llowing　years　by　institutionalizing　the　markets　and
procedures，　thus　preparing　fbr　the　new　structure　fbr　the　vertical　division　of　pro－
duction　in　Asia　in　the　following　decades（Nagano＆Kondo　1999，　Ministry　of
Finance　1984，　Baishomondai　kenkyu－kai　1959，　Yoshida　1957）
　　　　The　Japanese　economy　started　to　grow　rapidly　in　the　following　years．　The
Economic　While　Paper　1956　declared　that　the　postwar　period　had　already　been
completed．　Having　just　started　to　pay　reparations　on　one　hand，　the　government
instituted　various　schemes　fbr　economic　cooperation　to　be　propelled　mainly　by
12
13
14
Translation　by　the　author．
Besides　reparations，　Burma　also　received　this　economlc　cooperatlon．
For　instance，　both　Malaysia　and　Singapore　were　still　under　the　British　colonial　regime　and
Britain　abandoned　the　right　to　claim　reparations．　Under　the　increasing　Cold　War　tensions，
the　industrialized　members　of　the　Allied　Forces　renounced　the　right　to　claim　reparations　in
order　to　mitigate　Japan’s　burdens，　which　in　turn　would　save　the　United　States　the　cost．　The
U．S．　was　then　supporting　Japan’s　survival　with　massive　assistance．　South　Korea　was　a
colony　of　Japan　before　and　during　the　war，　and　thus　was　legally　not　eligible　for　the　right．
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the　private　sector（Nagano＆Kondo　1999：7－9）15．　The　first　yen　loan　was
extended　to　India　in　1958，　and　the　Overseas　Economic　Cooperation　Fund
（OECF）16　as　the　official　implementing　body　of　yen　loans　was　established　in
1961，followed　by　the　establishment　of　the　Overseas　Technical　Cooperation
Agency（OTCA）17　fbr　technical　cooperation　in　the　fbllowing　year．
　　　　During　this　initial　period，　the　Ministry　of　International　Trade　and　Industry
（MITI）seemed　to　have　taken　the　lead　f（）r　overall　economic　cooperation，　while
the　Ministry　of　Foreign　Affairs（MOFA）was　in　charge　of　the　administration　of
reparation　payments　and　related　economic　cooperationl8．　The　term　economic
cooperation　was，　and　still　is，　to　a　large　extent，　used　as　an　encompassing　word　that
included　both　official　development　assistance　and　other　economic　activities　of
the　private　sector　in　developing　countries，　such　as　trade　and　investment．　Since
the　government　did　not　have　ample　room　fbr　aid　at　that　time　other　than　the
reparation　payments，　private　sector　players　were　regarded　mainly　as　the　agents
fbr　economic　cooperation．　MITI　started　to　publish　the　annual　Keizai－kyoJッoku
no　ge4jo　to　mondai－ten（the　current　issues　and　status　of　economic　cooperation），
which　is　usually　known　as　the　VVhite　Paper　on　Economic　Coopera　tion，　in　1958　and
onward19，　while　the　Ministry　of　Foreign　Affairs（MOFA）did　publish　the　sepa－
rate　annuals　named〃iagakuni－no∫θ吻kaihatsu　en1り（Official　Development
Assistance　of　our　country），known　as　the　OI）A　White’Paper，　fbr　the　first　time　in
19842°．MITI’s　white　papers　explicitly　defined　the　purpose　of　economic　coopera－
tion　as　Japan’s　trade　promotion，　which　would　also　contribute　to　economic　deve1－
opment　in　Southeast　Asian　countries．　For　instance，　the昭勧e　P吻er　1960　stated
that　Japan　needed　actively　to　participate　in　aid－giving　while　their　own　country
was　still　not　yet　wealthy　because　it　would　help　secure　export　markets　which
would　become　critical　for　Japan’s　economic　development　in　the　future（〃rhite
Paper　on　Ecoηαη’c　Cooperation　1960）．　The　Diplomatic　Bluebooks　by　MOFA
were　not　so　explicit　as　MITI，　but　also　noted　the　importance　of　economic　coop－
15　Prime　Minister　Yoshida　published　his　policy　guidelines　f（）r　economic　cooperation　with　Asian
　　　　countries　in　l　953，　where　he　emphasized　the　need　f（）r　the　private　sector　to　take　initiatives，
　　　　while　the　government　would　support　it　as　necessary（Nagano＆Kondo　l999：7－8）．　The
　　　　basic　policy　of　economic　cooperation　to　Asian　countries　was　agreed　at　the　cabinet　meeting
　　　　in　December　1953（JICA　l999：9，74）．
16　1n　the　administrative　reform　eff（）rts　of　the　government　in　the　late　l990s，　OECF　merged　with
　　　　the　Export－Import　Bank　of　Japan　in　1999　to　form　the　Japan　Bank　for　International　Coopera－
　　　　tion（JBIC）．?
19
20
OTCA　was　reorganized　to　become　Japan　International　Cooperation　Agency（JICA）in　l974．
Adivision　for　reparation　and　an　office　f（）r　economic　cooperation　to　Asia　were　established　in
the　Asian　Affairs　Bureau　of　the　MOFA．　They　were　reorganized　into　a　new　Economic
CooPeration　Bureau　in　1962．
The　white　paper　was　published　in　the　name　of　the　Trade　Promotion　Bureau　of　the　MITI
from　1964　to　1972．
MOFA　had　separately　Waga－gaiko　no　kinkyo（the　curr夢nt　status　of　our　diplomacy），　the
1）iplomatic　Bluebook，　since　l957　where　the　situation　of　repairation　payments　and　economic
cooperation　were　among　the　items　to　be　explained．　However，　the　explanation　in　MITI’s
while　paper　was　much　more　extensive　and　detailed．
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eration　in　the　country’s　economic　diplomacy　particularly　in　Asia，　adding　that　the
cooperation　by　the　government　would　mainly　be　in　the　sphere　of　technical　coop－
eration　due　to　its　tight　fiscal　status，　while　it，　on　the　other　hand，　would　assist　the
private　sector’s　initiative　（Diplomatic　Bんeわook　1957a：17；1959：23）．
　　　　Japan，　being　well　aware　of　the　hostility　and　vigilance　among　Asian　nations
toward　itself，　avoided　direct　involvement　in　almost　all　of　international　political
issues　during　this　period，　and　just　concentrated　its　effort　on　economic　aff註irs－
investment　and　trading．　For　instance，　Japan　had　to　give　up　its　proposal　fbr　the
Southeast　Asia　Development　Fund　in　1957，　facing　negative　responses　from　the
countries　in　this　region．　According　to　the　analysis　by　MOFA，　this　was　because
these　countries　did　not　like　Japan’s　resurgence　as　a　leading　country　in　the　region
（1）iplomatic　Blueわooん1957b：60）．　As　explained　above，　reparation　payments
of艶red　excellent　opportunities　under　the　circumstances．　They　created　systems
and　networks　of　bilateral　economic　relations　in　the　region，　and　after　reparation
payments　ended，　various　schemes　of　economic　cooperation　substituted　them，
fUrther　strengthening　the　ties．
2．ODA　as　a　Diplomatic　Tool　and　the　Duty　of　a　Responsible　Nation　in
　　the　International　Community（1970s）
　　　　The　situation　started　to　change　toward　the　end　of　the　1960s．　With　the
rapidly　increasing　power　and　influence　of　Japan　in　the　world　economy，　Japanese
leaders　gradually　gained　confidence　and　started　to　talk　about　Japan’s　role　as　a
responsible　member　of　the　international　community．　MITI’s　White　Paper　1969
goes：
If　we　maintain　our　unique　stance　ofbeing　a　peace－loving　nation　and　actively
use　our　economic　power　for　the　development　of　Asian　nations，　then　we　will
be　able　to　receive　a　level　of　esteem　that　is　in　accordance　with　our　economic
power，　and　will　gain　a　voice　in　the　international　political　sphere（昭乃ゴ’e
Paper　oηEconomic　Coopera　tion　1969：80）21．
　　　　In　order　fbr　Japan　to　become　credゴble，　accordingly，　economic　cooperation
now　needed　to　be　extended　as　the　duty　of　a　powerfUl　member　of　the　international
community　regardless　of　its　own　private　or　national　interests（〃ihite　Paper　on
Economゴc　Cooρeratわn　1971，1972）．　This　was　considered　helpfUl　fbr　improving
the　national　image　which　had　not　hitherto　been　particularly　favorable（1）iplo－
matゴc　Blueわooん1971）22．
　　　　The　years　1973－1974　came　as　the　first　important　turning　point　for　Japan’s
ODA．　Two　distinctive　incidents　need　to　be　named　here　as　the　factors　which
21　Translation　by　the　author．
22　While　described　as・an　economic　animal　in　many　Asian　developing　countries，　Japan　was
　　　considered　as　something　inapprehensible　in　Western　industrial　democracies．
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instigated　the　change．
　　　　Most　importantly，　OPEC’s　oil　embargo　on　the　pro－Israeli　U．S．　allies　in　1973
brought　about　a　significant　change　in　Japan’s　fbreign　policy　and　ODA．　The
expected　oil　shortage　had　driven　Japan’s　economy　and　society　into　confusion．
　　　　By　this　time，　many　European　governments　had　been　trying　to　establish　ties
with　the　Middle　East　through　economic　cooperation　already　fbr　some　years23．
Facing　the　notification　of　25％production　curtailment　by　OPEC　in　November
1973，the　EC　quickly　issued　a　declaration　to　support　the　United　Nations　Security
Council　Resolution　No．242　that　demands　Israel　withdraw　f士om　the　Occupied
Areas，　and　its　members　soon　obtained　the　status　of“friendly　nations”which
were　to　be　exempted　from　the　production　a（加stment（1）iplomatic－Bluebook
1974）．
　　　　Japan　fbllowed　suit．　Special　Headquarters　for　Petroleum　Issues　were　set　up
in　the　cabinet，　and　started　to　deliberate　about　the　Ineasures　to　be　taken　by　the
government．　Japan　had　traditionally　had　no　substantial　contact　with　this　region．
Establishing　economic　relations　with　these　countries　was　perceived　as　an　urgent
task　The　chief　cabinet　secretary　issued　a　statement　denouncing　Israel，　and　the
deputy　prime　minister　was　dispatched　to　the　region　as　special　envoy　of　the　prime
minister　seeking　the　establishment　of　friendly　relations．　He　successfully　ob－
tained　understanding　and　the　exemption，　leaving　the　details　of　economic　coop－
eration　with　the　talks　to　be　held　in　the　following　year（White．Paper　on　Ecoηoアη’c
Cooρeration　19乃，1974）．
　　　　In　this　way，　through　the　political　decision　of　its　top　leadership，　Japan　even－
tually　offered　an　aid　pledge　of　three　billion　dollars　together　with　the　policy　of
distancing　itself　from　lsrael　in　exchange　for　the　continuing　crude　oil　supply　from
these　countries（Orr　1990：54－55；Nakanishi　1999：163－164）．　Economic　coopera－
tion　with　the　Middle　East　increased　rapidly　in　the　f（）110wing　few　years，　cement－
ing　friendly　relationships　with　the　countries　in　this　region（White　Paper　on
EconomたCo（～peration　1974，1）iplomatic・Blueわooん1974）．　Stable　supPly　of　petro－
leum　from　these　countries　was　secured．　After　that，　accordingly，　aid　became“the
centerpiece　of　resource　diplomacy”24（Yasumoto　1990：493），under　which　Japan，
concerned　with　energy　security，　also　tried　to　diversify　its　energy　sources，1eading
to　the　new　concept　of　comprehensive　security　at　the　turn　of　the　new　decade．
　　　　Besides，　the　massive　and　violent　anti－Japanese　demonstrations　that　greeted
Prime　Minister　Kakuei　Tanaka　in　ASEAN　capitals　in　January　1974　fbrced　Japan
to　reconsider　its　fbreign　policy　toward　Asia．　From　the　very　start　of　postwar
23This　move　was　noted　in　the　report　by　MITI’s　energy　survey　mission　in　l971．　MOFA　ex－
　　　pressed　in　their　1）iplomatic　Bluebook　in　1972　their　desire　to　establish　friendly　relations　with
　　　these　countries
24　The　1970s　was　the　decade　when　many　developing　countries　tried　to　gain　power　and　influence
　　　in　international　politics　by　uniting　themselve．s　as　opposed　to　the　advanced　industrial　world，
　　　using　natural　resources　as　their　powerful　weapon．　The　behavior　of　the　OPEC　countries　was
　　　one　of　the　most　typical　and　successfu1　cases，　while　the　UN．　resolution　on　the　New　Interna－
　　　tional　Economic　Order（NIEO）was　another　one，　but　less　effective．・
一8一
f（）reign　relations，　Asia　had　always　been　fbr　Japan　the　priority　region　with　which
the　country　needed　to　maintain　good　and　peaceful　relations25．　Japanese　economic
activism　in　the　region　was　supposed　to　be　the　reflection　of　its　carefully　consid－
ered　resolution　not　to　become　politically　dominant　there　again．　This　was　de－
signed　to　win　favor　among　neighboring　nations　by　contributing　to　economic
development　in　their　countries．　In　fact，　however，　through　the　reparation　pay－
ments　and　other　forms　of　economic　cooρeration，　including　provisions　of　yen
loans，　Japan’s　economic　power　had　dominated　the　whole　region（except　for　the
areas　under　the　communist　rule）it　had　in　vain　previously　tried　militarily　to
dominate（Ministry　of　Finance　l　984：536－537）．　Strong　resentment　shown　in
many　Latin　American　countries　against　dominant　U．S．　capital　had　been　under－
stood　by　Japanese　political　and　business　leaders　as　a　warning，　and　these　incidellts
clearly　indicated　that　proposed　counter－measures　to　prevent　similar　reactions
could　not　take　effect（JVhite、Paper　on　Economic　Cooρeration　1971）．
　　　　The　media　report　of　violent　expressions　of　anti－Japanese　sentiment　by　stu－
dents　and　citizens　in　streets　in　Bangkok　and　Jakarta　shocked　the　people　and　the
government　of　Japan．　Something　had　gone　wrong，　and　urgent　remedies　were
perceived　definitely　as　necessary．　ODA　was　mobilized　again　as　a　diplomatic　tool
here　to　re－establish　more　friendly　ties　with　these　countries　by　increasing　both　its
volume　and　its　concessionality．
　　　　At　the　same　time，　the　govemment　more　generally　started　to　seek　f（）r　ways
to　weaken　the　commercial　image　of　its　aid　in　response　to　criticism　from　both
developed　and　developing　countries　to　the　effect　that　Japan’s　economic　coopera．
tion　served　only　to　enrich　itself（Yasumoto　1990：493）．　MITI　now　needed　to　be
more　cautious　in　defining　the　nature　and　the　purpose　of　its　economic　coopera－
tion，　and，　as　mentioned　above，　started　to　claim　that　the　reason　fbr　Japan　to　give
aid　was　that　it　was　the　obligation　of　a　responsible　member　of　the　international
community．　On　the　other　hand，　MOFA，　who　had　well　recognized　the　effective－
ness　of　ODA　as　a　diplomatic　tool，　became　more　enthusiastic　about　it．1）iplomatic
Bluebooks　in　the　1970s　also　advocated　the　importance　of　increasing　ODA　as　the
duty　of　Japan　now　that　it　had　already　become　an　economic　power　in　the　world．
While　talking　about　the　duty　or　obligation　of　Japan　as　an　economic　power，　both
MITI　and　MOFA　were　also　explicitly　aware　of　the　external　vulnerability　of
Japan’s　economy　which　was　heavily　dependent　on　trade　and　external　resources．
Maintaining　good　and　harmonious　relations　with　many　countries　in　a　peaceful
world　was　perceived　as　critical　fbr　Japan’s　national　survival　and　prosperity．　This
was　the　basic　objective　of　diplomacy（Kawashima　2003：1）and　foreign　aid　had
come　to　be　considered　as　an　important　instrument　f（）r　this．
　　　　In　fact，　a　move　to　consider　economic　cooperation　as　a　potentially　effective
diplomatic　instrument　had　emerged　some　time　earlier．　At　the　summit　talks
25　The　first　Diplomatic．Bluebook　published　in　September　l　957　declared　the　Three　Principles　of
　　　Japan’s　Foreign　Policy．　One　of　the　principles　was‘‘to　maintain　the　status　as　an　Asian　na－
　　　tion，”while“to　maintain　harmonious　relations　with　western　democracies”was　another
　　　（1）’Plomatic、Bluebook　1957a：7－8）．
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between　Japan　and　the　U．S．　in　January　l　965，　Prime　Minister　Eisaku　Sato　agreed
with　U．S．　President　Lyndon　Johnson　on　the　importallce　of　economic　cooperation
負）rthe　political　stability　of　the　developing　world，　particularly　in　Asia26．　The
Economic　Council（keizai　shingi一んαのresponded　to　this，　proposing　to　set　the
principles　of　giving　aid　accordingly27．
　　　　In　time，　as　Japan　became　the　third　largest　economy　in　the　world　in　the　high
growth　period28，　it　came　to　realize　that　the　logic　behind　the　strategy　of　separating
economics　and　politics　no　longer　worked（Nester　1992：9）．　Japan，　as　one　of　the
major　powers　in　the　western　bloc，　now　needed　somehow　to　be　involved　in　various
political　and　strategic　matters　within　the　international　community，　at　the　same
time　maintaining　its　pacifist　identity．
　　　　The　afore－mentioned　turning　point　of　1973－1974　came　with　these　gradual
changes　in　the　background．　The　two　incidents，　the　oil　crisis　and　the　anti．
Japanese　demonstrations，　confirmed　the　necessity｛br　change．　Both　MITI　and
MOFA，　often　referring　to　proposals　by　various　advisory　boards　or　councils，
started　to　argue　eloquently　about　the　role　of　Japan　as　one　of　the　major　powers　in
the　world，　and　defined　economic　cooperation，　ODA　in　particular，　as　the　most
appropriate　instrument　fbr　the　task．　A　notable　event　in　this　regard　was　tlle　first
G－6summit　meeting　in　France　in　l　975．　Having　received　an　invitation　to　this
f（）rum　of　the　world’s　major　industrial　powers，　Kawashima，　a　f（）rmer　senior　dip－
lomat　and　vice　minister　of　fbreign　affairs　from　l　999　to　2001，　reca11s，“there　was
agenuine　sense　of　achievement　in　Japan”（Kawashima　2003：4）．　The　postwar
national　aspiration　fbr‘‘occupying　an　honored　position　in　an　international　soci－
ety”29　had　come　about．　Japan’s　power　and　prestige　was　acknowledged　again．
Now　it　needed　to　be　a　resρonsiわle　power　in　the　world．　Increasing　ODA　became
the　government’s　priority　policy．
　　　　However，　Japan’s　ODA　as　compared　with　other　major　industrial　powers
was　still　significantly　poorer　both　in　terms　of　quantity　and　quality．　In　1976，
while　the　size　of　the　economy（GNP）was　the　second　largest　in　all　r7　DAC
countries，　the　total　amount　of　ODA　was　the　fourth　largest，　and　its　share　in　GNP
was　much　lower　than　the　DAC　average，　and　thirteenth　largest　of　all．　The　posi一
26　Japan－U．S．　joint　statement（Asahi　Shimわ繊Ianuary　l　4，1965，　evening　issue）．　This　had　been
　　　U．S．　foreign　policy　in　order　to　prevent　communist　expansion　to　the　Third　World　since　the
　　　Kennedy　administration．　Japan　concluded　its　prolonged　normalization　negotiations　with
　　　South　Korea　later　in　the　year　to　extend　substantial　economic　cooperation　as　quasi－
　　　compensation．　This　spurred　the　high　economic　growth　from　the　late　1960s　in　the　Cold　War
　　　front－1ine　state．
27　According　to　the　proposal，　the　principles　would　beこ（1）to　realize　humanitarian　welfare
　　　societies　everywhere，（2）to　support　economic　independence　and　development　of　less－
　　　developed　countries　in　order　to　guarantee　the　balanced　growth　of　the　world　economy，　and
　　　（3）to　stabilize　political　conditions　in　developing　countries　to　promote　world　peace（Nagano
　　　＆Kondo　l　999）．
28Japan’s　nominal　GNP　surpassed　that　of　West　Germany　to　become　the　second　largest　in　the
　　　western　bloc　in　l　968（隔”e　Paper　oη肋〃ゴEconomア1969）．
29　Preamble　to　the　Constitution　of　Japan．
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tions　in　quality　indicators　were　even　worse，　nearly　at　the　bottom　both　in　grant
share　and　grant　element．　With　the　completing　reparation　payments30，　the　grant
section　was　diminishing31，　while　private　flows　also　declined　in　the　mid－1970s　due
to　the　recession　after　the　oil　crisis．
　　　　The　Committee　on　Economic　Cooperation　Policy（taigaゴkeizaikアoulッoku
shingi－kai）submitted　a　proposal　to　the　prime　minister　in　August　l　976，　recom－
mending　the　government　to　propel　economic　cooperation　strongly　and　with　a
firm　determination．　In　order　to　improve　the　poor　performance，　it　proposed　to　set
numerical　targets　for　ODA　so　that　Japan　wollld　reach　the　DAC　average　level　by
1980．MOFA　took　the　lead32　and　made　an　ODA　doubling　plan　in　1977，　which
was　favorably　accepted　by　the　political　elite　and　was　soon　made　public　interna－
tionally．　As　one　of　the　major　economic　powers，　Japan　had　to　play　a　role　that
duly　reflected　its　status，　and　needed　to　offer　ODA　in　line　with　the　international
level　in　terms　of　both　quantity　and　quality．　With　the　drastic　appreciation　of　yen
in　1977－78，　the　doubling　plan，　which　initially　aimed　at　increasing　the　amount　of
ODA　twofbld　in　five　years，　was　altered　in　1978　to　reach　the　same　target　in　three
years，　successfully　attaining　the　target　by　a　large　margin　in　1980．　Such　a　distinc－
tive　effort　by　Japan　was　applauded　on　various　occasions　at　international　forums，
and　the　White　Paper　on　Economic　Cooρeration　1979　proudly　declared　that　a　new
era　had　come　f（）r　Japan　to　take　leadership　in　the　world’s　North－South　problem，
claiming　that　Japan　could　bridge　the　gap　between　the　North　and　the　South　by
effectively　communicating　with　the　both　sides（White　Paper　on　Economic　Coqρ一
eration　1979：55）．
3．ODA　as　a　Duty　of　Japan　as　a　Peace・loving　Big　Power（1980s）
　　　　Japan’s　ODA　increased　rapidly　from　the　late　1970s　to　the　mid－1990s，　when
aseries　of　ODA　mid－term　plans　were　fbrmulated　and　strongly　propelled（See
Table　1　below）．　While　fiscal　reform　emerged　as　an　important　agenda　fbr　the
government，　and　thus　the　growth　ill　most　public　expenditures　and　investments
was　contained，　ODA　and　defense　expenditures　came　to　be　known　as　the　sacred
exceptions，　and　continued　to　rise。　Although　the　rationales　for　such　an　excep－
tional　increase　were　manifbld，　ODA　was　mainly　understood　as　a　necessary　cost
or　duty，　and　at　that　time　the　most　appropriate　fbrm　of　international　contribution
for　Japan　as　an　economic　power，　a　peace－loving　nation，　and　a　huge　creditor
nation　in　the　world　economy．
　　　　The　two　waves　of　oil　price　hikes　in　the　previous　decade　had　resulted　in
30
31
32
The　last　payment　was　made　to　the　Philippines　in　l　976，　which　concluded　all　the　war　repara－
tion　payment　of　Japan．
In　1961，　when　DAC　was　established，　reparation　payments　accounted　fbr　6α8％of　Japan’s
ODA，　while　the　equivalent　figures　declined　sharply　to　25．8％in　1965　and　4．0％in　1970
（Wh　ite、PαPer　oηEconom’c　Co（）1フeアα‘’on　1975）．
According　to　a　former　senior　diplomat，　the　first　initiative　for　this　move　emerged　at　the
working　level　within　the　Economic　Cooperation　Bureau　of　the　ministry，　rather　than　from
the　above．（The　author’s　interview　with　a　former　senior　official　of　MOFA，　May　2004）．
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Table　10DA　Mid－Term　Targets
　　　　　　TARGET 　　　　　　　　　　　　　一`CHIEVEMENT
lst　Plan　I
i1977－80）
＄2．848billion　in　l980
iDoubling　the　amount　in　3yrs）
＄3．304billion　in　1980
2nd　Plan
i1981－85）
＄21．36billion　in　1981－1985
iDoubling　the　amount　of　l976－80）
＄18．071billion　in　l981－85
3rd　Plan
i1986－92）
＄7．594billion　in　1992
iDoubling　the　amount　in　7yrs）
＊TransR）rmed　into　4th　plan　in　1988
4th　Plan
i1988－92）
Over　＄50　billion　in　1988－92
iDoubling　the　amount　of　l983－87）
＄495billion　in　l988－92
5th　Plan
i1993－97）
＄70－75billion　in　1993－97
i十improving　the　share　in　GNP）
＄57．78billion　in　1993－97
（Source：JICA　1999）
recession　in　most　of　the　advanced　industrial　economies　in　the　1980s，　as　well　as
in　non－oil－producing　developing　countries．　In　addition，　faced　with　the　unsolved
problems　of　development　and　poverty　still　prevalent　in　the　South　after　more　than
two　decades　of　development　assistance　from　the　North，　the　effectiveness　of　aid
came　into　question．　As　a　result，　the　momentum　for　aid　was　lost　in　many　DAC
countries，　causing　their　growth　in　ODA　to　become　stagnant．　This　tendency　was
called　aidプ’atigue．
　　　　The　Japanese　fiscal　status　was　not　much　better，　yet　Japan　found　a　unique
role　in　this　field．　As　a　world　economic　power，　Japan　naturally　had　a　due　role　to
play，　but　the　role　did　not　have　to　be　the　same　as　those　of　other　countries（1）iplo－
matic　Bluebook　1981）．　The　most　appropriate　role　fbr　the　peace－loving　Japanese
was　assumed　to　be　a　total　focus　on　expanding　ODA　under　the　prevailing　circum－
stances　of　aid　fatigue　so　that　Japan　would　contribute　to　creating　and　maintaining
peace　in　the　world（1）iplomatic　Bluebook　1980，　White　Paper　on　Economic　Coρρ一
eration　1981）．　This　was　identified　as　the　very　special　role　of　Japan，　a　pacifist
nation　by　constitution，　which，　at　the　same　time，　was　exceptionally　heavily　de－
pendent　on　external　trade　for　its　own　survival．　Playing　such　an　important　role
was　considered　to　be　fulfilling　Japan’s　obligation　in　the　world．．ODA　had　thus
become　a　priority　foreign　policy．
　　　　It　also　obtained　the　status　of　an　important　security　policy．　A　Ministerial
Meeting　for　Comprehensive　Security　was　set　up　in　the　cabinet　in　December　l　980
to　explore　the　issue　of　national　security　in　a　comprehensive　manner　to　incorpo－
rate　not　only　defense　but　also　foreign　and　economic　policies　into　the　scheme．
The　new　policy　was　named　the　Comprehensive　Security　Strategy，　for　which
ODA　was　defined　as　one　of　the　most　important　and　effective　policy　tools　at　hand
（1）iplomαtic　Bluebook　1981，　White」Paper　on　Economic　Cooρeration　1981）33。
33　1n　response　to　the　prime　minister’s　inquiry　into　a　desirable　economic　cooperation　policy　for
　　　the　future，　the　Committee　for　Economic　Cooperation　Policy　submitted　a　report　to　the　prime
　　　minister　in　November　1980．　The　report　defined　economic　cooperation　as　a　security　policy
　　　in　a　wide　sense　and　recommended　to　expand　it（Vahite　Paρer　on　Economic　Cooρeration　1980）．
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　　　　The　second　ODA　doubling　plan　was　announced　in　January　l　981，　fbllowing
the　successful　conclusion　of　the　first　one．　Special　consideration　came　to　be
deemed　necessary　in　annual　budget　allocation　in　order　to　keep　this　ambitious
international　commitment，　and，　accordingly，　the　ODA　budget　mushroomed．　As
aresult，　Japan　became　the　second　largest　bilateral　ODA　donor，　surpassing
France　in　the　mid－1980s，　and　Japan’s　international　contribution　and　responsibil－
ity　as　an　aid　power　（enjo　taikoku）　began　to　be　discussed．　In　the　light　of　the
country’s　ever　increasing　enormous　trade　surplus，　friction　over　trade　issues　with
major　trading　partners，　the　US．　in　particular，　had　caused　bilateral　relations　with
these　countries　to　become　increasingly　acrimonious．　Redirecting　part　of　the
surplus－which　was　called‘‘surplus　recycling”－to　elsewhere　in　order　to　reduce
the　pool　was　certainly　welcomed　in　this　regard．
　　　　The　1）iplomatic　Bluebook　1987　declared　that　the　time　had　come　for　Japan　to
make　a　historic　transfbrmation　to　become“Japan　contributing　to　the　whole
world”（1）iplomatic－Bluebook　1987）．　The　government　announced　an　Interna－
tional　Cooperation　Plan　in　1988　in　order　to　ensure　the　realization　of　a　Japan　that
would　contribute　to　the　world．　Bearing　the　costs　of　world　peace　and　stability
was　identified　as　the　responsibility　of　Japan　as　a　peace－loving　major　power．　It
was　argued　in　addition　that　this　would　also　serve　Japan’s　own　interest　by　secur－
ing　the　nation’s　peace　and　prosperity，　which　were　otherwise　rather　vulnerable
（1）iplomatic　Bluebook　1989）．　The　central　policy　instrument　here　was　ODA
（1）ilフ10matic　Bluebook　1990）．
4．The　Role　and　Responsibility　of　Japan　as　Top　Donor（1990s）
　　　　Japan’s　ODA　exceeded　that　of　the　U．S．A．　in　l　989，　turning　the　country　into
the　largest　donor　for　the　first　time．　While　the　US．　returned　to　the　top　position
in　1990，　Japan　resumed　it　again　in　1991　and　stayed　there　until　the　end　of　the
decade．　This　was　very　significant　fbr　Japan　which　had　been　struggling　to‘‘oc－
cupy　an　honored　place　in　an　international　society．”34　As　a　country　which　had
“renounce（d）．．．the　threat　or　use　of　f（）rce　as　means　of　settling　international　dis－
putes，”35　and，　theref（）re，　had　been　searching　for　a　way　to　make　its　international
contribution　through　non－military　means，　ODA　had　been　identified　as　an　ex－
tremely　important　instrument（Diplomatic－Blueわooん1991）．
　　　　This　quite　naturally　led　to　the　self－defined　role　and　responsibility　of　the
country　as　the　world’s　leading　donor．　Aid　fatigue　was　still　prevalellt　in　the　aid
community，　but－or　rather，　because　of　that－Japan　as　the　responsible　top　donor
continued　to　increase　its　ODA．　In　terms　of　quality，　for　which　Japan’s　ODA　had
been　notorious，　Japan　had　also　been　making　a　substantial　effbrt　to　improve　its
34　Preamble　to　the　Constitution　of　Japan．
35　Article　9，　the　Constitution　of　Japan．
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tied　aid　status36．
　　　　Maintaining　the　large　aggregated　quantity　and，　to　a　lesser　extent，　improving
its　quality　was，　however，　not　considered　sufficient．　As　the　top　donor，　Japan
needed　to　play　a　leading　role　in　policy　discussions　and　policy－making　in　the
international　aid　community．　Its　active　participation　in　DAC　discussions　was　a
case　in　point，　and　co－organizing　TICAD（Tokyo　International　Conference　on
A丘ican　Development）meetings　with　the　United　Nations　and　others　was　an－
other．
　　　　In　addition，　as　an　aid　power，　it　was　considered　that　Japan　had　to　have　a
consistent　philosophy　and　policy　fbr　its　ODA　which　was　explicitly　prescribed　as，
for　instance，　a　basic　law．　Japan’s　responses　to　the　military　crack－downs　of　the
democratization　movements　in　Myanmar　and　China　in　the　late　1980s　had　do－
mestically　been　criticized　as　merely　f（）llowing　other　m句or　donors　without　its
own　consideration　or　definite　policy37．　After　the　Gulf　Crisis　of　the　early　1990s，
when　Japan　experienced　a　hard　diplomatic　blow（to　be　explained　below），　the
necessity　came　to　be　fblt　even　stronger．　In　February　1991，　the　ruling　Liberal
Delnocratic　Party（LDP）’s　Comprehensive　Policy　Institute　suggested　the　estab－
lishment　of　explicit　guidelines　for　fbreign　policy，　including　ODA．
　　　　MOFA　prepared　draft　policy　guidelines　fbr　ODA　in　the負）llowing　March，
and　after　some　coordination　with　other　ministries　and　the　LDP，　the　prime　min－
ister　announced　the　Four、Pア’nciples（～プ01）A　in　the　Diet．　These　were　further
expanded　to　make　a　policy　document　after　one　year：the　ODA　Charter　was　ap－
proved　by　the　cabinet　in　June　1992．
　　　　As　the　basic　philosophy　of　Japan’s　ODA，　the　Charter　first　referred　to　the
universal　issues　of　humanitarian　consideration，　recognition　of　the　inter－
dependence　of　all　nations，　and　the　necessity　for　environmental　conservation　as
the　reasons　fbr　providing　ODA．　These　reasons　were　in　addition　to　the　specifi－
cally　Japanese　one　of　the　due　contribution　of　a　peace－loving　economic　power．
Then，　it　specified　fbur　factors　which　would　be　taken　into　account　in　deciding
provision　of　ODA：1）environmental　sustainability，2）avoidance　of　any　military
or　conflict－related　use　of　ODA，3）the　country’s　situation／attitude　regarding
defense　expenditure　and　the　development／production／export　of　weapons　of　mass
destruction（WMD），　and　4）the　country’s　effort　towards　democratization　or
introduction　of　a　market　economy，　and　the　situation　regarding　human　rights　and
freedom．
36With　the　two　more－frequently－cited　quality　indicators，　the　grant　share　and　the　grant　element，
　　　　improving　Japan’s　figures　to　approach　the　DAC　standard　was（and　still　is）almost　impossi－
　　　　ble　as　long　as　Japan　considered　yen　loans　as　the　important　part　of　its　ODA．　Other　major
　　　　bilateral　donors　do　not　have　loan　schemes　and　just　provide　most　of　their　aid　as　grant，　which
　　　　makes　their　grant　share　and　grant　element　near　100％．正oans　accounted　fbr　50．8％of　ODA
　　　　budget　in　Japan　in　l999　（Diplomatic、Blueわooん2001）．
37　Many　donor　countries　suspended　their　on－going　aid　projects，　or　froze　any　new　ones　in　pro－
　　　　test．　This　was　understood　to　be　a　political　conditionality　aiming　to　promote　domestic　policy
　　　　change　within　the　recipient　country　using　aid　as　leverage．　Non－intervention　was　Japan’s
　　　　basic　principle　of　fbreign　policy．
一14一
　　　　Equipped　with　this　new　and　comprehensive　policy　document，　Japan　worked
hard　to　fulfill　its　responsibility　as　the　top　donor　and　a　responsible　member　of　the
international　community．　It　maintained　top　donor　status　f（）r　ten　years　until
2000，although　its　ODA　growth　stopped　in　the　mid－1990s．
　　　　Two　important　events　need　to　be　noted　here　which　significantly　affected　the
course　of　Japan’s　ODA　in　the　twenty－first　century．
　　　　The　first　was　the　Gulf　Crisis　in　1990－1991．　In　response　to　the　Iraqi　aggres－
sion　against　neighboring　Kuwait　in　August　1990，　twenty－nine　nations　partici－
pated　in　forming　the　Multinational　Forces　under　U．S．　leadership　and　fought
against　this　international　outrage．　Since　joining　the　Multinational　Forces　was
not　an　option　because　of　its　constitution，　Japan，　instead，　made　huge　financial
contributions　totaling　l　3　billion　dollars　to　the　Forces　and　the　adjacent　countries
in　the　region．　This　was　an　enormous　amount．　Both　the　Japanese　people　and　the
government　were　confident　that　it　was　an　appropriate　contribution，　in　accor－
dance　with　the　country’s　wealth　and　status．　However，　the　international　commu－
nity　did　not　agree．　It　was　soon　reported　that　the　U．S。　Congress　had　denounced
Japan，　describing　Japan’s　response　as“too　late　and　too　little．”　The　Kuwaiti
government　did　not　mention　Japan　when　after　the　crisis　it　acknowledged　with
gratitude　the　united　international　supPort．
　　　　This　really　was　an　unexpected　hard　blow　to　Japan　which　had　been　trying
hard　to　become　a　responsible　and　respected　member　of　the　international　commu－
nity．　Japan　lost　face，　which　was　extremely　important　fbr　the　country　and　the
people．　There　was　a　burst　of　harsh　criticism　against　the　government　fbr　this
awful　policy　failure　which　had　wasted　taxpayers’money．　The　Japanese　govern－
ment　urgently　needed　to　address　the　problem　by　redefining　its　role　and　the　fbrm
of　its　international　contribution．　Money　alone　did　not　count：human　contribu－
tion　was　now　perceived　as　indispensable．　In　fact，　responding　to　pressure　from
Washington，　the　government　had　submitted　a　United　Nations　International　Co－
operation　Act　bill　to　the　Diet　in　the　autumn　of　l　990，　which　would　enable　over－
seas　activities　of　the　Self　Defense　Forces（SDF）for　non－combat　purposes　in
support　of　U．N．　Peace　Keeping　Operations（PKO）．　It　did　not　pass，　however，
re且ecting　the　very　controversial　nature　of　the　issue　in　Japan．　More　discussions
and　negotiations　were　required　before　the　first　PKO　non－combat　troops　were
finally　dispatched　to　Cambodia　in　1992．
　　　　This　was　not　necessarily　to　mean　that　the　importance　of　ODA　and　other
types　of　financial　contribution　was　soon　to　decrease　as　the　means　of　Japan’s
international　cooperation38．　Yet　the　necessity　for　human　contribution　to　interna－
tional　peace，　in　addition　to　financial　contributions，　came　to　be　well　recognized．
MOFA　explicitly　acknowledged　the　advent　of　new　f（）reign　policy　in　Japan　in　the
　38　　The　1）iplomatic　Bluebook　1991　states：
　　　　　　　The　most　important　policy　tool　for　Japan　through　which　we　fulfill　our　international
　　　　　　　responsibility　and　the　role　is，　and　will　be　in　the　fUture　as　well，　economlc　cooperatlon．
　　　　　　　In　this　sense，　expanding　ODA　is　our　top　priority　policy　issue．（1）iplomatic　Bluebook
　　　　　　　1991’35）．
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postwar　period（1）iplomatic．Bluebook　1991）．　The　logic／rhetoric　of　ODA　as　the
single　most　appropriate　form　of　international　cooperation　no　longer　sounded
very　plausible．
　　　　Another　important　change　came　from　the　political　decision　by　the
Hashimoto　govemment　in　1997　fbr　drastic　fiscal　ref（）rm．　During　its　prolonged
recession，　Japan’s　fiscal　balance　rapidly　deteriorated丘om　the　early　1990s，　be－
coming　the　lowest　of　the　G7　countries　with　a　deficit　of　5．6％of　its　own　GDP　in
199739．Recovering　a　healthy　fiscal　balance　through　structural　reform　was　per－
ceived　as　an　urgent　task．　Accordingly，　the　last　three　years　of　the　decade（1998－
2000）was　designated　as　the　lntensive　R〔グb〃ηPerゴod，　when　a　bold　reform　would
be　strongly　propelled　to　curtail　all　expenditures，　with　no　exception4°．　The　ration－
ale　for　changing　the　priority　fbr　fbreign　policy　was　the　domestic　fiscal　crisis
situation，　and　the　renewed　policy　emphasis　in　the　field　of　ODA　was　on　improv－
ing　quality　rather　than　expanding　quantity．　The　prime　minister　had　announced
the　1伽e　P励吻les（～f　the　Fiscal　Reform　two　months　earlier，　under　which　no　more
mid－or　long－term　plan　that　required　budget　allocation　would　be　made41．　This
practically　terminated　the　policy　of　expanding　ODA　with　mid－term　plans　as　the
engine　of　growth．
　　　　The　ODA　general　account　budget　for　the　1998　financial　year　was　decreased
by　10．4％，　and　has　continued　to　decrease　up　to　2005，　apart　from　1999　which
showed　a　slight　increase．　Expanding　ODA　was　no　longer　a　government　policy
in　the　late　1990s．　Instead，　increasing　attention　was　paid　to　the　changing　f（）rms
of　human　contribution　through　the　SDF　acting　overseas　within　the　tight　con－
straints　of　the　peace　constitution．
5．AQuest　for　Quality　and　Japan，s　lnternational　Cooperation　as
　　　an　Ordinary　State
　　　　Despite　the　strong　initiative　of　the　Hashimoto　government　towards　im－
proved　fiscal　balance，　Japan’s　deficit　did　not　decrease，　staying　around　7－8％　of
GDP　until　the　most　recent　years．　The　volume　of　ODA，　accordingly，　showed　a
sharp　decline．　In　the　international　war　against　terror　since　September　l　1，2001，
on　the　other　hand，　poverty　is　now　understood　as　one　of　the　major　sources　of
nourishment　for　terrorism，　and　therefbre，　many　other　donor　countries　renewed
their　ODA　commitment　in　order　to　alleviate　poverty42．　Their　ODA　started　to
show　a　significant　increase，　which　makes　a　sharp　contrast　with　that　of　Japan．
Japan’s　ODA　was　decreased　by　35．9％（U．S．　dollar　base）43　in　seven　years　from
1995，when　it　recorded　the　largest　amount，　to　2003，　and　its　ratio　to　GNI（GNP）
?????」 ? ?
43
Ministry　of　Finance．（http：／／www．mof．go．jp／jouhou／shukei／syO14／syOl4e．htm）．
Cabinet　decision，　June　3，1997．
The　Prime　Minister’s　Office（http：／／www．kantei．go．jp／jp／zaiseikouzou／5gensoku．html）．
Many　western　donor　governments　agreed　to　form　a　consensus　to　increase　ODA　at　the　lnter－
national　Conference　on　Financing　for　Development　in　Monterray，　Mexico，　in　March　2002
（http：／／www．un．org／esa／ffd／aconfl98－11．pdf）．
The　equivalent　figure　on　the　yen　base　is　14，7％．
一16一
飴ll　from　O．28％to　O．23％during　the　same　period．
　　　　People’s　support　fbr　ODA　is　also　obviously　declining．　According　to　the
opinion　polls　on　fbreign　policy　annually　conducted　by　the　cabinet　of盛ce，　in　the
late　1970s，　when　Japan　embarked　on　the　series　of　mid－term　plans，　over　40％of
people　thought　that　Japan　needed　to　increase　ODA．　Throughout　the　1980s
nearly　40％held　the　same　opinion，　while　the　percentage　declined　sharply　in　the
1990s　when　Japan　remained　as　the　top　donor　but　its　economy　went　into　long
recession．　Those　who　thought　that　ODA　had　to　be　decreased　as　much　as　possible
accounted　fbr　only　5－7％until　the　late　l　980s，　but　the　figure　increased　rapidly　in
the　l　990s，　finally　surpassing　the　figure　fbr　people　in　favor　of　increasing　ODA　in
2002．The　most　recent　survey（2003）shows　l9．0％of　the　sample　was　for　the
increase，　while　25．5％was　against　it“．　On　the　other　hand，　more　than　ten　years
have　passed　since　the　legislation　of　the　controversial　International　Peace　CooP－
eration　Act　of　1992，　and　a　certain　understanding　and　support　have　already　been
established　fbr　the　SDF’s　overseas　operations　as　an　important　fbrm　of　the　coun－
try’s　international　contribution45．
　　　　With　all　these　developments　as　the　background，　an　important　event　in　re－
cent　years　has　been　the　revision　of　the　ODA　Charter　in　August　2003．　The　pur－
pose　of　this　was　to　redefine　the　role　of　Japan’s　ODA　in　response　to　the　drastic
changes　in　the　post－Cold　War　world，　as　well　as　within　the　country　during　the
previous　decade．
　　　　One　of　the　most　significant　changes　in　this　revision　was　the　explicit　defini－
tion　of　the　purpose　of　Japan’s　ODA　as　being　in　the　national　interest．　The　very
first　lines　of　the　Charter　defining　the　o切ectives　are：
The　objectives　of　Japan’s　ODA　are　to　contribute　to　the　peace　and　develop－
ment　of　the　international　community，　and　thereby　to　help　ensure　Japan’s
own　security　and　prosperity．
Since　the　1970s，　when　ODA　was　defined　as　the　role　and　responsibility　of　a　peace－
loving　economic　power，　Japan　did　not　explicitly　talk　about　its　own　national
interest．at　least　officially　to　the　people．　Rather，　the　reSponsiわ’1妙was　considered
sometimes　as　a　heavy　burden　to　be　carried，　despite　its　obvious　cost　to　the　coun－
try．　It　was　important　that　the　cost　not　be　avoided　in　order　to　gain　trust　as　a
peace－10ving，　responsible　power　within　the　international　community（1）iplomatic
－Bluebook　1982）．　The　previous　Charter　did　not　explicitly　mention　the　benefit　for
Japan，　but　defined　ODA　only　as　its　responsibility　and　mission46．
??．
46
http：／／www8．cao．go．jp／survey／h15／h15－gaikou／images／zu28．gif
However，　the　same　opinion　polls　conducted　by　the　cabinet　office　show　that　support　for　more
active　participation　in　the　United　Nations　Peace　Keeping　Operations　has　been　declining
since　the　terrorist　attacks　in　September　2001（http：／／www8．cao．go．jp／survey／hl5／hl5－
gaikou／images／zu33．gif）．
It　only　hesitantly　alluded　to　some　benefit　in　the　last　sentence　of　the　paragraphs　on　the　basic
philosophy：”It　is　expected　to　enhance　the　friendly　relationship　with　other　countries，　particu－
larly　with　developing　nations”（ODA　Charter　l992）．
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　　　　Prior　to　this　revision，　in　late　November　2002，　a　proposal　named　The　Basic
Stra　teg．〃br　Japan’s」Foreign　Poli（ッ加the　Twenり2ジ競Cθη伽ッwas　submitted　to
the　prime　minister．　It　was　a　result　of　intensive　discussions　among　some　promi－
nent　opinion　leaders　including　fbrmer　senior　diplomats，　business　leaders　and
academics　with　various　inputs　from　cabinet　ministers．　The　most　important　gen－
eral　point　in　the　proposal　was　to　firmly　establish　a　clear　national　strategy，　and
the　strategy　should　be　based　upon　national　interest47．　In　the　basic　policy　fbr　the
revision　of　the　ODA　Charter　f（）rmulated　by　the　Ministerial　Meeting　fbr　External
Economic　Cooperation　in　March　2003，　it　was　pointed　out　as　the　basic　idea　fbr
the　reform　that　the　specific　interest　of　the　nation－security　and　prosperity－
needed　to　be　made　explicit　as　important，　along　with　other　universal　values　of
importance　such　as　human　rights　and　democracy，　which　were　the　main　points　of
the　previous　Charter48．
　　　　By　talking　about　national　interest，　emphasizing　ODA’s　contribution　to　the
national　interest　for　the　Japanese，　the　Charter　clearly　intends　to　facilitate　under－
standing　and　support　of　the　people　fbr　ODA，　which　has　been　on　the　decline．
Sustaining　a　certain　level　of　popular　sllpport　is　indispensable　fbr　any　program
that　needs　public　expenditure．　Since　Japan　still　needs　to　donate　a　large　amount
of　ODA　as　its　due　contribution　to　the　international　community，　the　government
has　been　trying　to　recover　popular　support　by　ref（）rming　ODA49．　The　Charter　is
the　confirmation　of　this　continuing　eff（）rt　by　the　government．　In　addition，　how－
ever，　it　could　also　be　understood　as　the　expression　of　an　important　change　in
values：Pu「suing　national　interest　is　not　necessarily　being　selfish．
　　　　Theref（）re，　although　MOFA　claims　that　ODA　is　still　an　important　pillar　of
Japan’s　fbreign　policy（1）iplomatic　Bluebook　2004．・9），　as　does　the　prime　minis－
ter50，　the　role　that　had　previously　been　assigned　to　it　seems　to　have　been　lost．
Particularly　due　to　the　fight　against　terror　in　recent　years，　international　coopera－
tion　and　contribution　are　most　often　considered　in　terms　of　security51．　In　other
words，　the　strong　impetus　from　the　top　leadership　that　had　brought　the　amazing
increase　of　Japan’s　ODA　was　lost，　partially　due　to　the　fiscal　difficulties　but　in
part　because　its　effectiveness　in　securing　a　good　reputation　for　Japan　in　the　inter－
national　community　came　to　be　rather　limited．　The　time　fbr　Japan　to　develop　its
own　very　special　identity　occurred　during　the　1980s　after　it　recovered　its　lost
confidence．　It　was　then　searching　f（）r　a　way　to　establish　itself　as　something　very
unique　and　special．　Japan’s　uniqueness　or“own　way”was　emphasized，　based
upon　the　perception　of　its　uniqμe　historical　path，　which　was　considerably　differ一
?????
????
http：／／www．kantei．gojp／jp／kakugikettei／2002／1128tf．html
http：／／www．mofa．gojp／mof司／gaiko／oda／kaikaku／sochi／t－minaoshi／030314．html
Raising　transparency，　accountability　and　efficiency　was　perceived　as　necessary　together　with
facilitating　national　participation　under　the　reform（http：／／www．kantei．gojp／jp／kakugike
ttei／gaiseisitu／9901070de．html；http：／／www．mofa．gojp／mof勾／gaiko／oda／kaikaku／image／
ugoki．jp9）
http：／／www．kantei．gojp／jp／koizumiphoto／2003／03／140da．html
For　instance，　see　the、Diplomat’c　Blueわooん2004．
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ent　from　those　of　Western　countries．　Contribution　through　large　ODA　was　very
likely　identified　as　something　that　suited　such　a　situation．
　　　　Now，　however，　Japan　seems　to　have　stopped　searching　f（）r　this“uniqueness”，
and　has　started　trying　to　turn　itself　into　an　ordinary　nation　which　can　co－exist
harmoniously　with　other　nations．　Within　the　post－Cold　War　international　com－
munity，　various　new　powers　are　emerging　and　catching　up　in　many　respects　with
the　traditional　industrial　powers．　The　much－loved　expression，“Japan　as　the　only
non－western　industrial　power”is　losing　its　once－powerful　effect。　Japan　is　not　a
smper　power　but　an　ordinaiッpower．　It　does　not　have　to　be　the　single　largest
donor　country　of　ODA　and，　seemingly，　has　started　to　think　about　possessing　an
ordinary　defense　capacity　in　order　to　make　an　appropriate　international　contri－
bution，　which　had　been　a　taboo　in　the　post－war　history　of　Japan　until　very　re－
cently．　In　other　words，　Japan’s　due　contribution　to　international　society　has　to
be　made　both　in　terms　of　money　for　development（aid）and　manpower　for　secu－
rity　and　peace．　This　naturally　decreases　the　relative　importance　of　ODA．
III．　CONCL　UDI　VG　REMARKS
　　　　The　distinctive　surge　and　then　downturn　of　Japan’s　ODA　in　just　a　few　dec－
ades　can　be　readily　understood　against　the　quest　by　the　c（｝untry　fbr　an　honored
and　apPropriate　place　in　international　society，　as　has　been　described　so　far．
　　　　It　started　from　the　war　reparation　payment　in　the　mid－1950s，　which　really
was　an　inescapable　obligation　fbr　the　country．　With　the　extreme　shortage　of
resources　in　the　war－torn　economy，　however，　the　government　was　determined　to
utilize　every　possible　opportunity　for　its　own　recovery　and　development．　Repa－
ration　payment　and　economic　cooperation　were　soon　identified　as　providing
hopeful　links　fbr　Japanese　exports　to　the　large　Asian　market．　Therefore，　it　was
quite　reasonable　fbr　MITI，　rather　than　for　MOFA，　to　take　the　lead　and　propel
the　process　vigorously．
　　　　The　quick　recovery　ofthe　economy　and　the　succeeding　high　growth　brought
about　an　important　change．　With　the　increasing　size　and，　therefore，　impact　of
Japan’s　economy　in　the　world，　offering　ODA　became　a　self－defined　role　and　as
well　as　an　obligation　as　an　advanced　industrial　country．　Japan，　as　one　of　the
industrial　nations　of　the　world，　needed　to　offer　aid　to　developing　countries－just
like　other　advanced　countries．
　　　　As　time　passed，　however，　when　Japan　identified　itself　as　one　of　the　largest
economies　in　the　world，　its“catching－up”mentality　came　to　an　end．　Japan
started　emphasizillg　its　uniqueness，　the　difference　of　the　country　from　other
industrial　nations．　Its　apProach　to　international　contribution　could　be－or　had
to　be－different　from　other　major　countries．　Since　Japan　was　a　unique　peace－
loving　economic　giant，　its　contribution　to　the　world　was　most　appropriately　to　be
made　through　economic　means．　ODA　and　other　forms　of　economic　cooperation
should　have　been　the　most　suitable　tools　for　this．
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　　　　However，　again，　with　the　Gulf　Crisis　of　1990－1991，　Japan　realized　that　this
was　an　illusion　and　a　mistaken　policy．　When　most　of　other　countries　made
military　contributions　to　the　Multilateral　Forces，　solely　financial　contributions－
even　huge　amounts－were　not　appreciated　as　had　been　expected．　Economic　coop－
eration　was　not　necessarily　the　way　to　an　honored　place　in　the　international
community．　With　the　tight　constitutional　constraints　for　any　military／defense
related　matters，　which　were　still　firmly　supported　by　public　opinion　in　the　coun－
try，　a　new　quest　to　be　an　ordinary　nation　and　power　started　from　scratch，　and　has
gradually　been　gaining　a　certain　level　of　national　support．　This　move　naturally
accompanied　a　declining　support　fbr　economic　cooperation．
　　　　The　changing　Japanese　ODA　was　a　reflection　of　the　post－war　history　and
struggle　of　Japan’s　continual　search　fbr　an　honored　place　in　the　international
community．　Its　distinctive　surge　and　decline　was　amplified　during　the　period　of
its　high　economic　growth　and　drastic　appreciation　of　the　yen，　on　one　hand，　and
the　succeeding　economic　stagnation，　on　the　other．　Japan’s　international　respon－
sibility　and　obligation　to　the　power　and　status　it　has　acquired　throughout　history，
however，　is　still　there．　Japan　as　an　ordinary　power　may　have　to　realize　that
improving　the　quality　of　ODA　cannot　necessarily　function　as　an　excuse　for　de－
creasing　its　already　diminished　quantity．
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